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The Analyst's WorkBench is a deterministic integrated framework developed 
and used by the Weapons Planning Group at NAWC China Lake. The model has 
no stochastic capability which requires all analysis to be conducted using 
parameters based on expected values of occurrence. This thesis develops a 
stochastic enhancement that can be incorporated in the Analyst's WorkBench. 
Independent identically distributed (IID) events can be generated by calls to the 
enhancement as a parametric input. To demonstrate the application of a stochastic 
process within the Analyst's WorkBench, a test scenario of a ship defense model is 
developed. A large scale missile attack is simulated deterministically and 
stochastically to demonstrate the differences of a random probability of successful 
defense vice an expected value of success. It is shown that the stochastic results 
provide a more realistic simulation and that the deterministic results overstate the 




The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect 
the official policy of position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. 
Government. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is a review of the Analyst's WorkBench and discusses the 
motivation for developing a stochastic enhancement that could be incorporated 
within the model. The organization of the remainder of the thesis is presented at 
the end of the chapter. 
A. THE ANALYST'S WORKBENCH 
The Analyst's WorkBench (A WB) is an integrated framework for the 
interactive application of models and tools by the warfare analyst or fleet operator 
that was originally developed for use by analysts in NAWCWPNS Weapons 
Planning Group at China Lake California for Strike, AA Wand ASuW analyses. It 
is a highly flexible and extensible enviro~ent that can be applied across a broad 
set of analytical applications. It allows the analyst to step through complex 
scenarios, pausing at times, or events, to utilize a variety of analysis tools and 
models. The Analyst's WorkBench has an extensive graphical user interface which 
provides the user the ability to dramatically visualize the analysis as well as the 
capability to document analyses directly into presentations or documents. 
The Analyst's WorkBench has been used primarily at China Lake in a 
variety of applications. Initially planned as a replay tool for Weapons and Tactics 
Evaluation Center (WEPT A C) games, it is used to allow analysts an easy method 
to interact with scenarios and play uwhat-if?" excursions. It has been used to 
model Integrated Air Defense systems (lADS) to allow detailed investigation of 
strike scenarios. Its most recent application has been in a force mix study which 
draws heavily on efforts outside of the model to provide parametric inputs. It has 
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been used in US Navy fleet applications for quick verification of strike planning. 
The Analyst's WorkBench is highly modular in concept. The intent of the 
architecture is to facilitate analysts' development of highly specialized models to 
populate a library for future analysts to draw on. The Analyst's WorkBench was 
developed with a core set of models and intended to be grown with new models 
as the uses of the Analyst's WorkBench became more evident in the analytical 
community. A model can be developed for a specific or generic study. The analyst 
can select models from the library to support the study being conducted. The core 
framework of the model contains a simulation clock that can be interactively 
controlled, an event queue that can be modified on the fly, a graphic interface that 
can take DMA data to provide a realistic display as well as allow spherical or XY 
coordinate systems and a variety of measurement tools to give analysts immediate 
access to information in the midst of a simulation.[Ref. 1] 
The analyst's model is 11plugged into" the Analyst's WorkBench framework 
by way of Model Interface GuidelineS (MIGS). These MIGS allow the analyst to 
use only those portions of the Analyst's W ork.Bench which are germane to the 
study resulting in improved computer utilization. Parametric inputs are provided 
through a scripting function called A WSUM (Analyst's WorkBench Script of User-
defined Movements) and models can add commands to the AWSUM script via the 
MIGS architecture. The advantage of the MIGs 11hooks" are that as a model is 
developed, the overhead is significantly reduced because most of the common 
code can be called from the main model. Currently the model contains seven MIGs 
11hooks" that provide an ability for common events to be evaluated first as a 
computer system event, then as an Analyst's WorkBench event and finally as a 
model event. 
Key to the extensibility of the Analyst's WorkBench is the ability to switch 
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modes from a scripted depiction of a scenario to an interactive "what-if" analysis. 
As the name implies, Analyst's WorkBench is intended to be a tool that supports 
the analyst in a study effort and adapt to the study needs rather than scoping a 
study to adapt to the features of Analyst's WorkBench. 
The Analyst's WorkBench is written as an Object Oriented Program in 
Think™ Pascal and runs in a Macintosh environment. It can run on any Macintosh 
capable of 32-bit addressing although performance is obviously enhanced when 
run on 68040 processors or on a Power PC CPU. The complexity of the models that 
are plugged into the framework affect the amount of RAM actually required, but 
in general the Analyst's WorkBench will run reasonably well in an 8MB 
environment. 
Analyst's WorkBench currently has no ability to simulate a stochastic 
process. In its current employment, expected values are fed into the model and 
single runs are utilized to test scenarios. This prevents the examination of the 
effects of randomness of various components in systems unless multiple runs are 
conducted and the input values are systematically varied. Even this will not 
adequately capture the effect of random events because the expected value implies 
that all probabilistic encounters will be treated equally. Clearly this prevents 
examination of queues in targeting and radar tracking applications. 
The work of this thesis is to add a stochastic enhancement to the Analyst's 
Workbench. A tool set of common statistic distributions was written that can be 
called from the Analyst's WorkBench. To see the effect of stochastic modeling on 
a scenario similar to typical tasking of the Analyst's WorkBench, an Anti-Air 
Warfare/ Anti-Ship Missile Defense scenario was built. It contains a large, multiple 
asset threat and a defense-in-depth system that is sufficiently stressed to require 
queuing to be examined. 
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A model was built that runs within the Analyst's WorkBench framework. It 
runs multiple runs of the same scenario with some of the input parameters 
randomized to allow demonstration of the stochastic enhancement that was added 
to the Analyst's WorkBench. Specifically, range and probability distribution 
functions (pdf) for various weapon events were randomized and the effect of this 
randomization was measured against a deterministic formulation. 
The focus of this thesis is to describe the tools built to allow stochastic 
modeling within the Analyst's WorkBench architecture and to describe the Anti-
Ship Missile Defense Model built to demonstrate a use of a stochastic method. A 
typical scenario will be shown from both a stochastic and deterministic standpoint 
and compared. From this effort conclusions will be drawn as to the value of 
stochastic modeling within Analyst's WorkBench. 
B. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
1. Chapter II discusses the process used to develop a stochastic plug-in, the 
random generator utilized within the enhancement, and other statistical 
distributions that are supplied with the enhancement that can be used when 
specific distribution of random variables are desired. 
2. Chapterill discusses the scenario and the model that was developed to 
demonstrate the employment of a stochastic process within the simulation. 
A baseline scenario and excursions to the baseline are presented. 
3. Chapter N is a presentation of the results achieved from running 
Analyst's WorkBench using the model developed for this thesis including 
analysis of the ability of the stochastic simulation to produce statistically 
random parameters. 
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II. STOCHASTIC PLUG IN 
The most important aspect of building the stochastic enhancement was to 
build the statistical package from which random variables could be drawn. Law 
and Kelton [Ref. 2] provide a lengthy discussion of the types of statistical 
distributions that one might draw from in order to translate a real world model 
into a theoretical simulation. Selected algorithms demonstrated in the reference 
were developed into Pascal code and then incorporated as a unit in the Analyst's 
WorkBench model. This represents the majority of the coding effort that occurred 
in this thesis and is discussed in detail below. 
A. RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR 
Modelers are well aware that random number generators are not random at 
all and in fact do not want them to be in order to be able to reproduce results. 
Reference 2 presents ample discussion of the Linear Congruential Generators 
(LCG) as a means to produce pseudo-random numbers for use in describing 
variables. Once an LCG generates an output that appears as uniformly distributed 
between 0 and 1, additional statistical distributions can be easily produced. 
Clearly, the properties of the random number generator need to be rapidly 
generated variables that have uniform appearance without undue correlation and 
be reproducible. It is important to have a long period so that the simulation can be 
run long enough without risk of repeating numbers. Much discussion is given to 
the advantages of using prime modulus multiplicative LCGs and in determining the 
type of random number generator to use, it seemed unnecessary to develop a new 
LCG. In short, the Marse-Roberts code utilized in Reference 2 was sufficient to 
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provide very adequate random number generation. 
As previously stated, the Analyst's WorkBench is a Macintosh computer 
based model and the code is written in Think Pascal™ [Ref. 3]. Think Pascal™ does 
contain a random number generator but in order to (1) ensure portability to other 
platforms and (2) ensure adequate control of the random number generation, it 
was decided to utilize the Marse-Roberts random number generator presented in 
Law and Kelton. This code requires a 32-bit computer architecture to run properly 
and some older Macintosh platforms are only 16-bit architecture. However, the 
Analyst's WorkBench is also based on the 32-bit architecture and this was 
determined to be an acceptable solution. The LCG is described in Reference 2 and 
follows the formula: 
Zi = (a · ~ _ 1 + c)( modm) 
where c=O; 
a= 630,360,016; 
and m= 2,147,483,647. 
2.1 
The U(O,l) distribution is produced from Ui= Zi/m. The Marse-Roberts code 
provides the generation of the Uniform random numbers as part of the code uto 
avoid distortion and machine-dependent variation due to the method of 
computing and storing floating point numbers."[Ref. 2] This random number 
generator is widely used and the empirical chi-square, serial and runs tests were 
well presented in the reference so independent testing to verify the appearance of 
a Uniform random number was not necessary. Figure 2-1 shows a scatter plot of 
1000 random numbers generated from the first seed value in the code. Visually, 
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Figure 2-1: Generation of Random Numbers from Stochastic Plug-in 
The feature of Marse-Roberts code that made it particularly appealing was 
the ability to start 100 different streams of "TID uniform random" variables by 
calling sequential integer seed numbers. Thus, if a variety of random variables are 
required as input parameters within a simulation replication, determining the seed 
number can be accomplished by using an integer counter rather than explicitly 
providing seed values. 
The implementation of the generating U(O,l) is accomplished either by 
specific calls within a specific module or via AWSUM scripts, when implemented. 
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A random number, X, distributed Uniform (0,1) is called by rand(x) where xis the 
integer seed value for the LCG. 
B. STATISTICAL DISTRIBUTIONS 
Most simulations employing the Analyst's WorkBench would probably use 
variables from some well known statistical distributions where only the location, 
scale and shape parameters need to be defined. In fact, it is envisaged that a user 
of the Analyst's WorkBench in a stochastic environment would either know in 
advance the type of statistical distribution the variables came from or want to test 
a hypothesis using several different distributions. Reference 2 provides a fairly 
comprehensive compendium of useful probability distributions that were used as 
the basis for importing them into the stochastic enhancement developed for the 
Analyst's WorkBench in this thesis. The challenge was to transform the variables 
generated by the LCG into random variables representing these distributions that 
could be called by the model. Reference 2 suggests that when generating random 
variables one should take into account the exactness of the generated variable, the 
efficiency of the generation process and the robustness of the algorithm used. It 
discusses different ways to generate random variables but weighs the discussion 
heavily in favor of using the Inverse Transform Method that follows the general 
algorithm of: 
a. Generate U- U(O,l). 
b. Return X= r 1(U). 
The algorithms presented in Chapter Eight of Reference 2 were utilized as 
the basis of the stochastic unit code presented in Appendix A. The algorithms as 
they appears in Reference 2 are reviewed here with some explanation of how an 
10 
analyst might want to employ them with in the Analyst's WorkBench. In all cases 
the analyst would have to provide parameters to bound the distribution; location 
parameters,y, the scale parameters~, and the shaping parameters a. These 
parameters normally will be provided in the A WSUM script as part of the set up 
in lieu of a specific parameter value provided to the Analyst's WorkBench as it is 
presently used. An additional parameter required is a seed value. Using a variety 
of seed values for the generation of the initial uniform random variate will allow 
an additional if not arbitrary randomization facet. 
1. Uniform 
The Uniform Distribution is easily obtained because whenever a random 
number is called, a Uniform value distributed between 0 and 1 is returned. The 
algorithm used to generate a U(a,b) uniform variate is: 
1. Generate U-U(O,l) 
2. Return X = a +(b -a)U 
The code for this random variable is called by unifonnN and requires the 
analyst to supply a seed integer for the random number generator; and low and 
high real number to bracket the distribution. 
2. Normal 
The Normal distribution is certainly well understood and widely used in a 
variety of applications. One use is the simulation of munitions impact circular 
error probable (CEP). The algorithm to create the Normal distribution actually 
produces two liD Normal (0,1) random variates but only one is utilized in the call 
in order to simplify the scripting call in the program. The method selected to 
11 
generate Normal random variates is the polar method described by Marsaglia and 
Bray and is shown below:[Reference 4] 
1. Generate U1 and u2 as liD U(O,l), let vi = zui -I for i=l,2 and let 
2 2 W=V1 +V2. 
2. Ifw> 1, go back to step 1. Otherwise, let Y = J(-21nW)/W ,x1 = V1Y, and 
X2 = V2Y. Then X1 and X2 are liD N(O,l) random variates. 
It is noted [Ref. 2] this method is slower than some newer methods, but the 
simplicity of the method overrides the speed gains. Of note with the Normal 
distribution is that it can be used to generate negative values. This would not be 
useful in event queuing calls but can be very useful in placement decisions. If the 
analyst chose to use a Normal distribution for event queuing (such as determining 
actual launch time around a scheduled Time Of Launch) these events would have 
to be scheduled prior to running the event queue or inserting some mechanism to 
reject negative numbers. Also, the liD normal variates that are produced do not 
generate a true normal distribution since neither the Normal distribution or its 
inverse have a simple closed form. However, this should not be a problem in the 
application of the Analyst's WorkBench because extreme normal variables will 
tend to be rejected or numerically resolved in practice. 
The analyst must specify the seed number for the LCG and the location and · 
the shape of the distribution by supplying a mean(Jl) and a sigma value(cr). The 
random variable is then calculated by X' = Jl + o-X. The code is called by NonnalX. 
3. Exponential 
The exponential distribution is very useful for modeling interarrival times 
between events or service times that occur at a regular rate. Initial radar detections 
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could be modeled by an exponential distribution with the mean describing the 
average time between detections. 
The algorithm for generating an exponential random variable is shown 
below. Reference 2 makes the point that the U used in step 2 is actually 1-U to 
make the correlation between the X's and U's positive. The code does this without 
action of the analyst. 
1. Generate U-U(O,I) 
2. Return X= (-~)lnU 
The call to generate an exponential random variable is ExponentialX, 
specifying the seed value and a real :fS value. 
4. Gamma 
The shape of the Gamma distribution curves suggests a possible use to 
describe time to complete a task. The scale and shape parameters a~ describe the 
mean time to complete the task. There can never be negative or zero values. 
Reference 2 notes that X'- gamma( a,~) is merely ~(X- gamma (a,1) 
provided ~ > 0 and that the gamma (1,1) is the exponential distribution with mean 
1. This lead to the algorithm that has three different cases dependent on the value 
of a; 0 <a <1, a = 1 and a > 1. In the case where 0 < a <1, the algorithm specified 
in reference 2 as follows: 
1. Generate U1-U(O,l) and let P=bU1.1f P>l, got to step 3. Otherwise proceed 
to step 2. 
2. Let Y = P Ila., and generate U2-U(O,l).lf U2 ~ e -~return X= Y. Otherwise, 
go back to step 1. 
3. Let Y= -ln[(b- P)!a] and generate UrU(O,l).lf U2 ~ Y «-1, return X= Y. 
Otherwise, go back to step 1. 
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In the case where a.> 1, Reference 2 describes an algorithm developed by 
Cheng which use constants that were incorporated in this code as follows: 
1. Generate U1 and Uz IIDU(O,l). 
2. LetV= aln[< 1 ~~1 )] ,Y = a.ev,z = U 21U2 ,andW = b+qV-Y 
3. If W + d- ez;;:: 0, return X= Y. Otherwise, proceed to step 4. 
4. If W;;:: lnZ, return X = Y. Otherwise go back to step 1. 
The call to generate a Gamma random variable is GamnaN, specifying the seed 
value and a real a. and B value. 
5. Poisson 
The Poisson process is well understood as a description of interarrival times 
for most event queues where the probability of the next event occurring follows an 
exponential distribution. This process is particularly useful in modeling the rate 
that events are placed on a queue when the process leading to the appearance on 
the queue is not as important to the analysis. The call to generate a Poisson random 
variable is PoissionP, specifying the seed value and a real A value. 
6. Weibull 
The Weibull distribution can be used in reliability studies to specify the task 
completion times or equipment failure times. A Weibull distribution is useful in 
those instances where negative values about the mean are not desired. The Weibull 
distribution inverse-transform algorithm: 
1. Generate U IIDU(O,l). 
2. Return X= ~(-lnU)11a 
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The call to generate a Weibull random variable is weibull, specifying the 
seed value and a real a and B value. 
7. m-Erlang 
Many stochastic processes are described as following an Erlang 
distribution. The m-Erlang distribution is achieved by using a convolution 
algorithm to sum a series of liD exponential random variables with the same 
mean. The call to generate a m-Erlang random variable is mErlang, specifying the 
integer seed value, the integer m, and a real B value. 
8. Cauchy 
The Cauchy distribution is symmetric around zero, bell shape, but has 
considerably heavier tails than the normal distribution. The Cauchy distribution 
may be used similarly to the Normal but because of the heavy tails, no moments 
exist in the Cauchy. The mean of a collection of liD Cauchy variables is no better 
an estimator of the central tendency of the distribution than any of the individual 
observations. The call to generate a Cauchy random variable is eauchyx, specifying 
the seed value and a real median and B value. 
C. ADDITIONAL STOCHASTIC PROCESSES BUILT FROM 
COMBINATION OF DISTRIBUTIONS 
Using the technique of convolution, additional variables can be generated. 
The easiest method is to sum the random variables from different distributions. 
Reference 2 provides methodologies for generating the desired variables from 
combinations of distributions. The Analyst's WorkBench will generate these 
combinations of random numbers through custom A WSUM script calls. 
15 
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III. SCENARIO FOR TESTING THE STOCHASTIC 
ENHANCEMENT 
Once the stochastic enhancement was added to the Analyst's WorkBench, 
an example scenario was created to illustrate how this enhancement might be 
employed. As a result of this thesis research, a stochastic module can be 
implemented in future revisions of the Analyst's WorkBench but immediate 
implementation of this capability is not possible until supporting changes to the 
stochastic enhancements are provided in a future revision to the Analyst's 
WorkBench. Therefore a separate testing MIGS was implemented to run the model 
in a stochastic mode and to demonstrate that the stochastic mode would provide 
a different, more illustrative answer than would be obtained by running the 
Analyst's WorkBench in a deterministic mode. 
A. SHIP DEFENSE MODEL 
In an article that appeared in US Naval Institute Proceedings [Ref. 5], a 
scenario was proposed to demonstrate a comparison of force structure capability 
in the Littoral warfare environment. A flotilla of small USN fast attack craft was 
compared with a task force of two USN DDG-51 class destroyers to demonstrate 
the cost savings and force conservation that could possibly be obtained with a fast 
attack flotilla. In this scenario, the chief measure of effectiveness was how the force 
structure fared in a concentrated missile attack aimed at the on station forces. The 
hypothesis was that a third world nation could conceivably launch a large scale 
attack of 20 surface to surface anti-ship missiles against either a single DDG-51 or 
a forward deployed fast attack force. The intent of this scenario was to show that 
either force could be overwhelmed and destroyed. This scenario was the genesis 
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for the model developed to test the stochastic enhancement although the model 
was reduce in scope to represent a single ship's defense in depth against a fixed 
number of missiles. 
The module that was developed modeled a theoretical warship with a tier 
defense-in-depth system that would defend against a coordinated, large scale 
missile attack of 20 identical surface to surface missiles. The missiles would be 
launched nearly simultaneously from nearly identical distances so that the 
missiles would arrive at the ship's defensive perimeter at near simultaneous time. 
Each missile would have some probability of acquiring the target ship and some 
probability of detonating on the ship. It was decided that if three impacts occurred 
on the ship, the ship would be destroyed. 
The ship was designed to have an outer perimeter search radar that would 
alert the ship's defensive systems when an incoming missile was detected. The 
tracking capability of this radar was decided to be sufficient to prevent it from 
being overwhelmed in this scenario. An overall battle director would track and 
prioritize the incoming missiles and task the tiers to attack the incoming missiles 
as the missiles came into the tier's engagability envelope. The tier's range of 
defense did not overlap its adjacent tiers. Each tier had a finite number of assets to 
allocate against the incoming missiles and finite number of launchers that could be 
used to deploy these assets at a specific rate. As missiles were detected, the tiers 
would be tasked to target and attack the incoming missile with an interceptor 
missile. As a launcher fired an interceptor, it would reload and fire at the next 
assigned incoming missile. Figure 3-1 is a visualization of this scenario. 
This scenario became an analysis of what could be characterized as an MIG/ 
n [Ref. 6 ], Angry Customer Queue. The servers in each tier are the launchers that 
would "service" the incoming" customers" {the missiles) which could be assumed 
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to arrive in an liD manner. A manager (OTCManager) prioritizes each missile 
based on its distance to the ship and creates a queue of incoming missiles. 
/ 
Figure 3-1: Three Tier Defense-In-Depth ASMD Model 
If a tier could handle a missile but could not assign a launcher to the missile at that 
moment, the missile would remain in the queue. 
If the missile could not be serviced by the tier before the missile traversed 
the tier's range of responsibility, the missile would no longer be serviced by that 
tier and would be assigned to the next tier. H the final tier could not service the 
missile within a specific time, the missile would leave the queue and be scheduled 
to impact the ship (hence the angry customer). An impact counter kept track of the 
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number of impacts and the model ran until all missiles were serviced or impacted 
the ship. If three missile impacts occurred prior to all missiles completing their 
flight, the defense tiers were assumed to be inactive and all additional service 
events were canceled. Servicing a missile modeled reducing the available assets to 
provide service with each service event and the possibility that the servicing asset 
would be unsuccessful in servicing (i.e., miss) the missile. 
There was also the possibility the missile would miss the ship or fail to 
detonate which was modeled as a separate probability and had no effect on the 
customer queue. This is important to the model because the measure of 
effectiveness for this model was the ability to prevent more than three missiles 
from detonating on the ship. A failure to detonate would not prevent the servers 
from allocating an asset against the missile but would allow the model to continue 
to run its servers. 
While it is recognized that any impact against the ship would have a 
potential impact on the performance of the defenses, this model did not attempt to 
degrade performance by impact. 
This model is one dimensional; translating the missile's positional 
information into a distance value so that the graphical interface became 
unnecessary. In fact, the Analyst's WorkBench is not needed to demonstrate this 
model when run deterministically as the analysis can be done using rudimentary 
probabilities of the missile and ship characteristics. If this model were used in the 
Analyst's WorkBench environment, positional information and missile trajectory 
would be more important to demonstrate the attack more graphically. The 
conceptual nature of this model allows a great deal of latitude in the specification 
of parameters. This model could be more carefully refined to reflect more realistic 
behavior as desired. None of the results in this model should be construed to 
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provide definitive answers without further refinement. However, the model could 
be an excellent starting point for a more precise study of a ship's defensive 
capabilities using actual parameter values. In constructing this model, many of the 
real world ship defense characteristics where either ignored or folded into the 
analysis with some other parameters in order to keep the scenario simplistic 
enough to ease the validation of the stochastic module. For example, electronic 
countermeasures are an integral and significant portion of a modem warship's 
defense capability but rather than model that capability specifically in this module, 
it was decided to incorporate that into the inbound missile's probability of 
acquisition. 
B. PARAMETERS OF THE MODEL 
The parameters that effect the randomness in an object's performance are 
numerous and the level of model realism (and subsequent model complexity) is 
improved by utilizing as many of these parameters within the model as possible. 
Sensitivity analysis of those parameters would provide an indication of what 
should be actively modeled and what should be incorporated into assumptions. 
The intention of this thesis is to demonstrate how the model could be run 
stochastically so rather than establish a high fidelity model, a few choice 
parameters were selected to establish that the Analyst's WorkBench could work 
with the stochastic enhancement. 
1. Missile Parameters 
The attacking missiles were the objects in this model that had the most stochastic 
parameters. Each missile was determined to be an liD event that would have some 
randomness associated with it. In the case of the missile objects, the distance from the 
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target and the time of the missile launch were determined to be two parameters that 
would impact the inter-arrival times of the missiles in the attack most significantly. Speed 
is also something that can vary significantly but as the missiles were assumed to be 
identical, it was decided to hold speed constant. Table 3-llists the parameters that were 
assigned to each missile in the model. The model was constructed to allow changing these 
Table 3-1 Missile Parameters 
Number 
Distance from of Speed 
target at launch Time of launch Pacq pdet Missiles 
20 420knots -N(80run,lnm) -N(30secs,3secs) 0.97 0.83 
parameters prior to run time but this feature was not utilized. Missile parameters 
remained constant between base case and excursion runs that will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
The distance from a target can be a function of the navigational accuracy of the 
launching platform, geography of the region and man made impediments such as 
shipping traffic. It is reasonable to assume that if a simultaneous attack was desired, the 
position of each missile at the time of the launch order would be equi-distant from the 
target. Further, it is reasonable to assume that the impact of navigational accuracy, 
geography and shipping would cause the position of launch of all missiles to be 
distributed normally around a mean value selected on the basis of the range of the missile. 
The thesis module uses a normal distribution with mean of 80nm and sigma of 1 run for 
this scenario. 
Ideally, a simultaneous launch means that all missiles leave their launchers at the 
same time. In practice, there is some randomness associated with the time of launch that 
can be attributed to factors such as electrical circuitry, booster fusing and human error. 
The time of launch in this study was assumed to be normally distributed with a mean h-
hour time from the start of the model and a 3 second standard deviation. Because a 
negative time number is possible using this distribution, the code was written to force all 
times to t ~ 0. 
The probability a missile will acquire the target is certainly the function of myriad 
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parameters including missile guidance characteristics, target position uncertainty, flight 
profile and some ship defense aspects like chaff deployment and electronic 
countermeasures. Playing the stochastic aspect of each of these factors would distinctly 
add to the realism but also adds to the complexity of the model. Thus it was dedded that 
a single Probability of Acquisition value would be applied to this model and that it would 
considered a binomial distribution with each acquisition event run as a Bernoulli trial. 
Probability of Detonation is also considered as a Bernoulli trial. In most cases the 
probability of detonation is based on the reliability of the missile. In the model, random 
uniform numbers are generated from a uniform distribution and if the number is less than 
the spedfied number, the event is considered a success. 
2. Target Parameters 
The tiers were given a unique range of responsibility to prevent overlap problems. 
Each tier had a finite number of launchers that could launch an interceptor and recycle to 
launch another interceptor provided there were assets available in the tier. Each 
interceptor was given a Probability of Single Shot Kill ( P ssK) that was played as a Bernoulli 
trial. The interceptor's speed was held constant within each tier. Table 3-2 summarizes the 
characteristics of each tier. The P ssK used represents an alerted and defended target. 
Table 3-2: Parameters of Target Tiers 
Number of Number of Interceptor Max Min Tier Launchers Interceptors Speed Range Range PSSK (knots) (nm) (nm 
1 4 20 420 40 10 0.75 
2 2 10 300 10 3 0.63 
3 2 50 630 3 0.25 0.45 
The defense system utilized a "shoot -look- shoot'' tactic. One interceptor 
would be allocated against the incoming missile and no other action would be 
taken until the results of the Intercept event were known. It allows the same tier to 
allocate an additional asset against an incoming missile if an intercept event can be 
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generated prior to the attacking missile leaving the tier's range of responsibility. 
This model assumes instantaneous battle damage assessment (BDA) but could be 
easily modified to delay or degrade the knowledge that an interceptor had missed. 
C. MODEL OPERATION 
This model was written to evaluate the effect of random variables on the 
proposed scenario. This required multiple runs of the scenario and a statistical 
evaluation of the results of the data collected. Correlation was determined to not 
be a problem in this particular model but enough data points were desired to 
ensure adequate population of a histogram for analysis purposes. The model was 
constructed so that the analyst could specify the number of runs desired and 
change some of the scenario parameters to allow excursions from the baseline run. 
The scenario parameters that could be changed for the attacking missiles (bogeys) 
were the position of launch (mu and sigma), the time of launch (mu and sigma), 
the number of attacking missiles and the missile speed. The scenario parameters 
that could be changed for the target tiers were the acquisition range for the ship, 
the maximum and minimum ranges for each tier, the number of interceptors for 
each tier and the PssK for each tier interceptor. 
Data from each run was collected and written to output files that were then 
evaluated using data analysis software. The specific data that was of interest was 
the generation time and position of each attacking missile, and the time of arrival 
at the ship radar acquisition perimeter. The model collected data on the intercept 
events including the time and distance of the events and the success or failure of 
those events. Each run reported the number of impacts on the target and the 
number of attacking missiles killed. The final report of a scenario run was the 
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average number of impacts across all the runs that could then be compared to a 
deterministic calculation. 
D. EXCURSIONS 
The baseline scenario as described above was selected based on a desire to 
show defense in depth and the parameters selected tended to allow success of the 
model. It was desired to also demonstrate the effect of modification of parameters 
on the outcome of the scenario. Seven excursion runs were conducted to show 
degradation of the ships defensive capability. These excursions were to 
1. Reduce the PssK of each tier's interceptors by 25 percent. 
2. Reduce the PssK of each tier's interceptors by 50 percent. 
3. Reduce the engagability range of each tier by 50 percent. 
4. Reduce the engagability range of each tier by 75 percent. 
5. Reduce the engagability range of each tier by 75 percent and anchor the 
range to the outer perimeter. 
6. Reduce the number of interceptors in each tier by 50 percent. 
7. Reduce the number of interceptors in each tier by 30 percent. 
Of this list, only the engagability ranges merit explanation. In reducing the 
engagability range, the first two excursions were anchored to the ship; i.e., the 
third tier range was reduced by x% and then starting from the outer edge of tier 3' s 
perimeter, the second tier's engagability range was reduced and so on. However, 
these excursions produced unexpected results so an additional engagability range 
excursion was run to start at the outer range, reduce its engagability range by 75 
percent and then allow a gap in coverage to exist between the inner perimeter of 
one tier and the outer perimeter of the next tier. In this excusrion, each tier's outer 
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perimeter range matched the baseline case but its coverage range was reduced by 
75 percent. 
The baseline case and the excursions were each run 100 times. The data 
were collected and evaluated using a statistical software package for the 
Macintosh. The average runtime for each excursion was approximately 30 minutes 
running on a 68030 processor in 6 MBs of RAM. The data results will be presented 
in the following chapter. 
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IV. SIMULATION RESULTS 
The scenario was designed to demonstrate the difference between a 
deterministic approach and a stochastic simulation approach to answer an 
analytical question. The principal measure of effectiveness in the scenario is the 
number of attacking missile impacts against the ship. Three impacts were deemed 
to constitute complete target destruction. The deterministic results can be 
calculated analytically without simulation as can the stochastic results but with 
much higher calculation complexity and chance for computational error. The 
stochastic results must be evaluated to demonstrate the values generated by the 
model follow the distribution specified and to compare the combined run results 
with the expected values. The excursions can be used to demonstrate that the 
model is sensitive to parameter variations. 
A. DETERMINISTIC RESULTS 
Deterministically, each of the attacking missiles was initialized at 80NM, 
launched at time 0 and allowed to generate events based on the set parameters 
specified in the previous chapter. Thus, applying the probabilities assigned to the 
missiles and the interceptors, a single computation of the expected probability of 
single shot kill (PssK) is required. The number of impacts on the ship is the sum of · 







While these parameters could easily have been fed into the module and run 
once, the simplistic calculation was accomplished on a spreadsheet. 
The attacking missile PssK for the baseline case is 0.041 and the expected 
number of impacts is 0.82. The variance is 0.786. These are also the results for those 
excursions in which the only parameter that changes is the engagement range for 
each tier. In the case in which interceptor inventory is reduced, the expectation 
must be achieved by stepwise evaluation.Table 4-1 is the tabulation of results for a 
deterministic evaluation of the scenario. 
Table 4-1: Deterministic Scenario Results 
30% 50% 25% 50% 
Excursion: Baseline Interceptor Interceptor Interceptor Interceptor Inventory Inventory PssK PssK 
Reduction Reduction Reduction Reduction 
PssK 0.041 0.123 0.160 0.123 0.274 
Impacts 0.82 2.46 3.20 2.46 5.48 
These results indicate that a 20-missile-attack as outlined above would 
have an expected success as shown and that additional missiles added to the attack 
would have additional success in a linear manner. These numbers can also be used 
to determine the probability that three or more missiles would impact the ship by 
computing the binomial distribution using the expected P SSK and n = 20 as shown 
in Figure 4-1 below. This indicates that, using the stated parameters, the 
probability P(Number of Impacts~ 3) = 0.047. This probability could be used as the 
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Figure 4-1: Expected pdf of Baseline case 
B. STOCHASTIC SIMULATION RESULTS 
This section discusses the verification used to show that the model behaved 
stochastically. It was desired that the missile generation time and distance should 
appear to be randomly distributed about a mean generation time and distance. 
Data was also collected to determine the distribution of the interarrival times of the 
missiles at the outer edge of the defense perimeter. 
Running one hundred replications of the model produced 2000 missile 
events, which provided sufficient data to ensure statistically measurable results. 
The simulation is a terminating simulation in that the there were a finite number 
of missile events and a finite number of interceptors in each tier. The number of 
replications were selected to give sufficient random events to give each attacking 
missile liD characteristics. Each excursion was run with the same attacking missile 
parameters so validation of the performance of the baseline process was sufficient 
for the entire study. Statistical validation included standard statistical evaluation 
of the computed parameters. The data was collected as part of the model output 
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and then evaluated using Stat View 4.5™ [Ref. 7], a Macintosh based statistical 
analysis package. 
The simulation was designed to instantiate the attacking missile with a 
random launch time generated from a normal distribution N(30, 3). The histogram 
in Figure 4-2 demonstrates the launch time for the baseline model. 
Histogram 
of Bogey Generation Time (in seconds) 
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Figure 4-2: Bogey Generation Time Histogram (2000 Replications) 
The attacking missile's distance from the target ship was distributed 
-N(80nm, lnm). The histogram in Figure 4-3 demonstrates the results of the 
replications and shows that the parameters to be distributed as desired. 
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of Bogey Generation Distance (in NM) 
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Figure 4-3: Bogey Generation Distance Histogram (2000 Replications) 
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The interarrival times of the attacking missiles where not modeled 
explicitly but the data was collected and is shown in Figure 4-4 below. 
1000 7 
~ 
:::l 600 8 
400 
200 
0 2 4 6 8 10 1 2 14 1 6 1 8 20 22 24 
Seconds 
Figure 4-4: Outer Tier Bogey Interarrival Times (2000 Replications) 
The missile interarrival times appear to follow an exponential distribution. 
This was verified by using a Q-Q plot to compare against a random series 
generated from an exponential distribution with the same mean as the calculated 
mean of the interarrival times. As shown in Figure 4-5, the Q-Q plot is fairly linear 
at the lower ends indicating that the interarrival time values roughly follow the 
exponential distribution with a mean of 2.276. This distribution could be used as 
the parameter for determining when missiles arrived at the outer tier of the ship's 
defensive system. Using the interarrival time as the stochastic parameter would 
eliminate the need to explicatly model the starting point of the missile. However, 
most current analysts are interested in the complete flight path of incoming 
missiles so that the actual time of detection can be measured. This necessitates the 
modeling of the point of origin and time of launch for an attacking missile event. 
The interarrival times determine queue loading for the defensive system and as 
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Figure 4-5 Q-Q Plot Comparison of Interarrival Time (2000 
Replications) to Exponential Distribution (JJ. = 1/2.276} 
In general, the model behaved as expected in generating random variables 
from the appropriate distributions. 
C. MODEL RESULTS 
This section compares deterministic and stochastic results. First a 
comparison of the base cases is presented followed by an analysis of excursion 
cases. 
1. The Base Case 
Results were from the deterministic case as shown below. The results are 
Table 4-2: Comparison of Deterministic Results to Stochastic Simulation 
Mean Number of Impacts Variance of Impacts 
Deterministic Results 0.82 0.786 
Simulation Results 0.51 0.697 
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similar but the mean number of impacts is slightly different and the variance of the 
simulation appears less than in the deterministic case. The impact histogram for 
the base case (Figure 4-6) shows the relative frequency of impacts which can be 
interpreted as the probability distribution for the base case under the stochastic 
conditions at initialization. These results indicate that there is even less probability 
that any given 20-missile-attack will produce 3 or more impacts. In most cases, the 
defensive system will be sufficient to prevent any attacks from hitting the ship (i.e., 
P(number of impacts< 1) = 0.65) and most impacts will be less than that required 
to kill the ship. 
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Figure 4-6 pdf Histogram of Stochastic Simulation Run (Base Case) 
The simulation also provides a better understanding of the behavior of each 
tier's interceptors that can be readily compared to excursion cases. The base case 
interceptor success rate is shown below and demonstrates that the results are very 
close to the parameters specified at initialization. The overall success rate for the 
interceptors was 70.6 percent. This can be interpreted as the ship's probability of 
shooting down an attacking missile. 
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Figure 4-7 Interceptor Success by Tier 
Kill Miss 
In the base case the mean number of Interceptors used was 27.46 with a 
variance of 7.564. Figure 4-8 shows the distribution of interceptor usage by 
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Figure 4-8: Interceptor Utilization - Baseline Simulation Analysis 
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2. Excursion Analysis 
The excursions can be grouped into three main categories: reduction of 
interceptor probability of single shot kill, reduction of interceptor engagement 
range and reduction of interceptor inventory. The excursions in which the PssK of 
the interceptors was reduced showed the most significant increase in ship impacts. 
Interceptor inventory reduction also results in significant changes in ship impacts. 
Only the case in which engagement range was modified remained insensitive to 
changes. This is most likely an artifact of modeling the recycle rate of the launchers 
too rapidly. All attacking missiles had an opportunity to be engaged by at least one 
interceptor in each tier before the missile had traversed very far through the tier. 
Missile engagement was modeled as a uniform probability across the tier 
engagement range. Had the detection probability been modeled as a function of 
decreasing range, the model may have demonstrated more sensitivity in the 
reduced range excursions. 
a. Reduction of Interceptor Probability of Single Shot Kill 
Reducing PssK of each interceptor results an increased number of 
impacts in both the deterministic and the stochastic excursions. Table 4-3 
Table 4-3: Reduction of Interceptor P SSK Excursion 
Deterministic Stochastic 
Excursion Expected Number Simulation Mean 
of Impacts Number of Impacts 
Baseline Case 0.81 0.51 
1/4 Reduction of Interceptor PssK 2.46 3.25 
112 Reduction of Interceptor PssK 5.48 7.43 
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demonstrates that while the Baseline case has lower number of impacts in the 
stochastic case versus the deterministic case, the deterministic model is less 
sensitive to variance of the interceptor PssKparameter than the stochastic model. 
More PssK reduction excursions would probably demonstrate that the number of 
impacts on the ship would increase more rapidly in the stochastic simulation. 
b. Reduction of Interceptor Engagement Range 
In the deterministic case, altering the distance over which an 
interceptor is able to engage an incoming missile should have no effect in the 
expected number of impacts on the ship. No parameters that effect the probability 
of a missile impact are changed in this excursion. Thus in each case, one would 
expect the results to be the same. The mean and variance of each excursion are 
shown in Table 4-4. Note that while all the stochastic simulation values are 
Thble 4-4: Range Excursion Statistics 
Excursion Mean Variance 
Deterministic Case 0.82 0.786 
Baseline Case 0.51 0.697 
Half Engagement Range 0.52 0.676 
One Quarter Engagement Range 0.60 0.788 
One Quarter Engagement Range 0.53 0.898 
generally the same, they are all less than the deterministic calculation. This 
indicates that the ship's defensive systems are generally more successful in 
defeating incoming missiles than would be indicated by a deterministic 
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Figure 4-9 Comparison of Number of Impacts on Shlp by Range Reduction 
Excursion 
c. Reduction of Interceptor Inventory 
Intuitively, interceptor inventory is significant in the overall success 
of the ship defense system. ff the ship can not sustain a counter attack against the 
incoming missiles, more impacts will occur. Table 4-5 shows the comparison of the 
deterministic calculations and the stochastic simulation. Again the rate of change 
in the stochastic simulation is more rapid than in the deterministic simulation, 
indicating a higher sensitivity to changes in the interceptor inventory. Note that 
the expected number of impacts in the 50 percent inventory reduction case is 3.2. 
In the simulation results, the minimum number of impacts were three, which 
would imply under the specified scenario that there was a very low probability the 
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ship would escape destruction. Figure 4-10 shows the range of numbers of impacts 
in the excursion simulations. 
Table 4-5: Reduction of Interceptor Inventory Excursion 
Excursion 
Baseline Case 
30% Reduction of 
Interceptor Inventory 
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Figure 4-10: Box Plot Comparison of Simulation Results 
for Inventory Reduction Excursion 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The history of the Analyst's WorkBench and its limitations as a 
deterministic model have been presented in previous chapters. The development 
of a plug-in that would allow the Analyst's WorkBench to produce stochastic 
results and a test scenario has been shown. The analysis of the results has shown 
that different results occur within the scenario depending on whether the model is 
run stochastically or deterministically. This chapter provides observations and 
recomendations for implementation and future research efforts. 
A. OBSERVATIONS 
The Analyst's WorkBench currently provides a good framework for 
conducting analytical studies in which the output values are deterministic. Explicit 
modeling of a handful of entities can be accomplished easily and their input 
parameters statistically varied in order to perform sensitivity analysis. Large scale 
modeling using changes to input parameters quickly becomes unwieldy as the 
number of parameters increase. Modeling this way is useful for visualization of a 
few parameters but is not effective for evaluating a large scale operation. The 
addition of the stochastic enhancement allows the Analyst's WorkBench to be 
modified so that a large number of random processes can be evaluated easily and 
visualized effectively. 
Using the ship defense scenario and its excursions to generate output using 
the Analyst's WorkBench in a deterministic mode can be compared to its 
performance in the stochastic mode. In the deterministic case, for example, the 
only way to examine engagement activity would be to explicitly script the 
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the baseline stochastic excursion. Deterministically, all engagements would occur 
at the same engagement distance with the only variation occurring as a function of 
the reload capability of the tier. Every engagement should result in some damage 
to the missile and every missile should achieve some damage against the ship. This 
would be the same regardless of the excursion. Clearly in the stochastic example, 
the actual engagement range is distributed across the allowable engagement range 
and can be attributed to the interarrival times of the missiles, the reload times of 
the interceptors, and the probability of missile engagement. The damage to each 
missile and to the ship are discrete events that are independent of previous missile 
events. Intuitively, this is a more realistic simulation. 
Table 5-1 demonstrates the differences between a purely deterministic 
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model and a stochastic model with respect to the ship defense scenario. In all cases 
the stochastic model can demonstrate each of the aspects of distribution in a 
manner the deterministic model cannot. In some cases such as the mean number 
of impacts against a ship, the values of the deterministic calculation will be 
significantly different from results obtained stochastically and in others the model 
will be insufficient to demonstrate a feature that has analytical significance. 
Ability of Mean Distribution of Deterministic Model Engagement 
Baseline v )( 
Reduced Interceptor v )( 
Engagement Range 
Reduced Interceptor )( ){ 
Inventory 
Reduced Interceptor X )( 
PssK 
Table 5-l: Ability of Deterministic Model vs. Stochastic 
This is not meant to suggest that the Analyst's WorkBench as it is employed 
today is improperly used. Indeed, as a game replay mechanism, it is an easily 
manipulated tool. The ability to visualize the design of modeling methodologies 
makes a deterministic case very appealing. The #what if?" capability currently 
provided is essential for examining a question raised as the game is replayed. 
However, the ability to adequately examine a range of possibilities under a 
random environment is severely limited. A stochastic analysis better answers 
more specific questions such as, 1'How does changing my defense tier's 
engagement range affect my defensive capability?" 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The stochastic enhancement developed in this thesis is easily incorporated 
into future version of the Analyst's WorkBench. MIGS hooks allowing the switch 
to multiple runs of the same experiment should be provided in the basic 
framework. A WSUM script language should be modified to allow the analyst to 
specify the statistical distribution from which a parameter can be drawn. 
The developers of Analyst WorkBench may desire a visualization of the 
output from series of simulation runs. This would require the development of 
more specific data collection tools that would run at the framework level of the· 
Analyst's WorkBench. Data would then be collected from each run of the 
excursion. The statistical means of the excursion would then be used as a 
parameter for the visualization run. The final step of an excursion would be the 
replay of the visualization run. The ability to look at the parameter value as the 
visualization is run needs to be modified to show variance and range of the 
parameter as a minimum. Additional software design is required to explore this 
possibility. 
The scenario developed for this thesis is used for illustrative purposes only 
but may be useful in exploring the ability of a ship to defend itself. Further 
validation of the ship defense-in-depth process would result in a more realistic 
model that would be useful in studying defense-in-depth as a stochastic process. 
All ship defense capacity is a trade-off in ship offensive capability. 
A recent thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School [Ref. 8] suggested that the 
employment of chaff and electronic countermeasures were essential in increasing 
the likelihood of successful ship defense. This observation might provide a 
rationale for reducing ship defensive weapon inventory and allowing more 
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offensive weapon inventory. The model developed for this thesis combined with 
the scenario of Reference 5 would provide useful trade-off analysis to determine a 
ship weapon inventory and operational employment to ensure maximum 
survivability while allowing mission capability. 
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APPENDIX. STOCHASTICS UNIT CODE 
This chapter contains the Pascal code used to create the stochastic enhancement to 
the Analyst's WorkBench. 
unit Stochastics; 
{The beginning work for a stochastics unit to be incorporated in the Analyst WOrkbench 
Franework} 
{Created: 8 December 1993 by 
{ 
LCDR Andrew W. Melton, USN} 
Naval Postgraduate School} 
Monterey, CA} { 
{Revision History: 3 Aug 1994} 
{Incorporated Inverse Transforms from Law & Kelton usiJmJ.lation Modeling & Analysis" Chp8, 
1991} 
{29 July 1995 Added location, shape and scale parameters to several random variables} 





index, nl: Integer; 
Zset, Tset: Longint; 
Zrng: array[l •• 100] of longint; 















UniformN (x: integer; a, b: real): real; 
ExponentialX ( x: integer; lambda: real) : real; 
ganmaX (x: integer): extended; 
GamnaN (x: integer; alpha, Beta: real): real; 
Weibull (x: integer; alpha, Beta: real): real; 
PoissonP (x: integer; lambda: real) 1 real; 
PoissonNextEvent (lambda: real; x: integer) : real; 
mErlang (x, m: integer; Beta: real): real; 
NormalX (x: integer; mu, sigma: real): real; {Not a true Normal. but close 
enough} 
CauchyX (x1 integer; uedian, beta: real): real; 
Rand (Stream: INTEGER): real; {Generate the next random number} 
Randst (Zset: Longint; Stream: INTEGER); 
Randgt (Stream: Integer): Longint; 
implementation 
zstatsPtr = "ZStats; 




next: ZStatsPtr ~ 
eDd~ 
{This is a random number generator taken from Law & Kelton's book Simulation Modeling 
and Analysis,l991} 
{It is a PMMLCG supporting 100 streams of uniform random numbers} 
procedure Randdf~ {This may be something m:>re appropriately stored in one of the globals 
units} 
i: INTEGER; 
begin{set the seeds for all 100 streams} 
Zrng[1] := 1973272912; Zrng[2) := 281629770; Zrng[3] := 20006270; 
Zmg[4] := 1280689831; Zrng[5] := 2096730329; Zrng[6] := 1933576050; 
Zrng[7] := 913566091; Zrng[8] := 246780520; Zmg[9] := 1363774876; 
Zrng[IO] := 604901985; Zrng[ll] := 15ll192140; Zrng[12] := 1259851944; 
Zrng[13] := 824064364; Zrng[14] := 150493284; Zmg[15] := 242708531; 
Zrng[16] :=75253171; Zrng[17] := 1964472944; Zmg[18] := 1202299975; 
Zrng[19] := 233217322; Zrng[20] := 1911216000; Zrng[21] := 726370533; 
Zrng[22] := 403498145; Zrng[23] := 993232223; Zmg[24] := 1103205531; 
Zrng[25] := 762430696; Zrng[26] := 1922803170; Zrng[27] := 1385516923; 
Zrng[28) := 76271663; Zrng[29] := 413682397; Zrng[30] := 726466604; 
Zrng[31] := 336157058; Zrng[32] := 1432650381; Zrng[33] := 1120463904; 
Zrng[34] := 595778810; Zmg[35] := 877722890; Zmg[36] := 1046574445; 
Zrng[37] := 68911991; Zrng[38] := 2088367019; Zmg[39] := 748545416; 
Zmg[40] := 622401386; Zrng[41] := 2122378830; Zrng[42] := 640690903; 
Zrng[43] := 1774806513; Zrng[44] := 2132545692; Zmg[45] := 2079249579; 
Zrng[46] := 78130110; Zrng£47] := 85m6735; Zmg[48] := 1187867272; 
Zrng[49] := 1351423507; Zrng[50] := 1645973084; Zmg[51] := 1997049139; 
Zrng[52] := 922510944; Zrng[53] := 2045512870; Zrng[54] := 898585771; 
Zrng[55] := 243649545; Zrng[56] := 1004818771; Zmg[57] := 773686062; 
Zmg[58] := 403188473; Zrng[59] := 372279877; Zrng[60) := 1901633463; 
Zmg[61] := 498067494; Zrng[62] := 2087759558; Zrng[63] := 493157915; 
Zrng[64] := 597104727; Zrng[65] := 1530940798; Zrng[66] := 1814496276; 
Zrng[67] := 536444882; Zrng[68] := 1663153658; Zmg[69] := 855503735; 
Zrng[70] := 67784357; Zrng[71] := 1432404475; Zrng[72] := 619691088; 
Zrng[73] := 119025595; Zrng[74] := 880802310; Zrng[75] := 176192644; 
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Zmg[76] := 1116780070; Zmg[77] := 277854671; Zmg[78] := 1366580350; 
Zmg[79] := 1142483975; Zmg[80] := 2026948561; Zmg[81] := 1053920743; 
Zmg[82] := 786262391; Zmg[83] := 1792203830; Zmg[84J := 149466mo: 
Zmg[85] := 1923011392; Zmg[86] := 1433700034; Zmg[87] := 1244184613; 
Zmg[88] := 1147297105; Zmg[89] := 539712780; Zmg[90] := 1545929719; 
Zmg[91] := 190641742; Zmg[92] := 1645390429; Zmg[93] := 264907697; 
Zmg[94] := 620389253; Zmg[95] := 1502074852; Zmg[96] := 927711160; 
Zmg[97] := 364849192; Zmg[98] := 2049576050; Zmg[99] := 638580085; 
Zmg[100] := 547070247; 
eDd; {Rancid£} 
functiOD Rand (Stream: INTEGER) 1 real; {Generate the next random number} 
c:onst 
B2ElS = 32768; 
B2El6 = 6SS36; 
MODULUS = 2147483647; 
MULTil = 24112; 
MULTI2 = 26143; 
var 




Zi := Zrng[Stream); 
HilS := Zi div B2El6; 
LowPrd := (Zi - HilS * B2El6) * MULTI!; 
LowlS := LowPrd div B2El6; 
Hi31 := HilS * MULTil + LowlS; 
OVflow := Hi31 div B2ElS; 
Zi := (((LowPrd- LowlS * B2El6) -MODULUS) + Hi31 - OVflow * B2ElS) * B2El6 + 
if Zi < 0 then 
begin 
Zi := Zi + MODULUS; 
eDd; 
HilS := Zi div B2El6; 
LowPrd := (Zi - HilS * B2El6) * MULTI2; 
LowlS := LowPrd div B2El6; 
Hi31 := HilS * MULTI2 + LowlS; 
OVflow := Hi31 div B2ElS; 
Zi := (((LowPrd- LowlS * B2E16) -MODULUS) + Hi31- OVflow * B2E1S) * B2E16 + 
if Zi < 0 then 
begin 
Zi := Zi + MODULUS; 
eDd; 
Zrng[Stream) := Zi; 
Rand := (2 * (Zi div 2S6) + 1) I 16777216.0; 
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New( 'l'enpFtr) ; 
TempPtr". Zindex : = index; 
TempPt.r".Zvalue := Z; 
TempPtr".Next := Zlist; 
Zlist := TempFtr; 
end; { AddToList} 
procedure Randst (Zsetc Lonqint; Stream: INTEGER); 
begin {Randst} 
{Set the current Zrnq for stream Stream to Zset} 
Zrng[Stream] := Zset; 
ead; {Randst} 
fuuctioa Randqt (Stream: Integer) : Lonqint; 
begin {Randqt} 
{Return the current Zrng for Stream} 
Randqt : = Zrng[ Stream] ; 
eDd; {Randqt} 




teupO := Rand(x); 
UniformN := a + (b - a) * tempO; 
end; {UniformN} 
functioa ExponentialX (x: integer; lambda: real): real; 




tempO := Rand(x); 
ExponentialX := - ( ln (1 - tempO) I lambda.) ; 
end; {ExponentialX} 
functioa qam:naX (x: integer): extended; 






if X > 250 then 
begin 




teupProd := 1; 
for n := 1 to x - 1 do 
begin 
~od := ~Prod * n; 
eDd; 
ganmax := TempProd; 
eDd; 
eDd; {ganmax} 
f1mct:ion GallmaN ( x: integer; alpha, Beta: real) : real; 
{This gives a number from a Gamma Distibution and is taken from pg 488-89 of L&K} 
var 
begin 
gamna, b, tempU1, tempU2, Y, V, zu, a, q, theta, d, W: real; 
e: extended; 
success: boolean; 
e := Exp(1); 
success := false; 
if Beta < 0 then 
begin 




if alpha < 0 then 
begin 




if alpha = 1 then 
begin 




if (alpha > 0) aDd (alpha < 1) then 
begin 
b := (e + alpha) I e; 
while DOt success do 
begin 
tempU1 := Rand(x) * b; 
{This P from pg 488 of Law & Kelton} 
if tempU1 > 1 then 
begin 
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Y := -ln( (b - tempUl) I alpha); 




if ln(tempU2) <= ln(Y) * (alpha - 1) then 
begin 
qanma := Y; 
success : = true; 
end; {first test} 
Y := ln(teuq;>Ul) I alpha; 
Y t= exp(Y); 
tempU2 := Rand(x); 
if teuq;lU2 <= exp(-Y) then 
begin 
end; 
ganma := Y; 
success := true; 
end; {second test} 
end; {while statement} 
end {O<alpha<l} 
else 
begin{ alpha > 1} 
a := 1 I sqrt(2 * alpha - 1); 
b :=alpha- ln(4); 
q := alpha + 1 I a; 
theta := 4.5; 
d := 1 + ln(theta); 
while not success do 
begin 
tempU1 := Rand(x); 
tempU2 := Rand(x); 
V :=a* ln(tempUl I (1- tempU1)); 
Y :=alpha * exp(V); 
Zu := sqr(tempUl) * tempU2; 
W := b + q * V - Y; 
if W + d - theta * Zu >= 0 then 
begin 
ganma := Y; 




if w >= ln(Zu) then 
begin 
ganma := Y; 








GammaN := gamma * Beta; 
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end; {GamnaN} 
function Weibull (x: integer; alpha, Beta: real) 1 real; 
var 
tenpU 1 real; 
begin 
tempO 1= Rand(x); 
Weibull := exp(ln(Beta) + ln(-ln(tempU)) I alpha); 
end; {Weibull} 
function PoissonP (x: integer; lambda: real) 1 real; 
{Returns a probability based on a Poisson distribution} 
var 
begin 
TempProd I extended; 
n: Integer; 
LnP: real; 
TempProd I= 1; 
ifx=Othen 
{this prevents some divide by 0 errors- Still need to provide some guidance on inputing } 
begin {negative integers} 




for n := 1 to x do 
begin 
TempProd : = TempProd * n; 
end; 
LnP : = X * ln (lambda) - lambda - ln ( TempProd) ; 
PoissonP 1 = exp(LnP) ; 
end; 
end; {PoissonP} 





TempT := Ln(Rand(x)) I (-lambda); 
PoissonNextEvent := TempT; 





tempU := 1; 
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for index := 1 to m do 
begin 
tempO : = tempO * Rand (X) i 
ead; 
mErlang :=-(Beta I m) * ln(tempO); 
ead; {mEr lang} 
fuDc:ticm NormalX (x: integer; lml, sigma: real): real; {Not a true Normal but close 
enough} 
var 
V1, V2, 01, 02, W, Y, X1, X2: real; 
begin 
w := 1.5; 
while W > 1 do 
begin 
01 := Rand( X); 
02 := Rand(x); 
V1 := 2 * 01 - 1; 
V2 := 2 * U2 - 1; 
W := sqr(V1) + sqr(V2); 
ead; 
Y := sqrt( (-2 * ln(W)) I W); 
X1 := V1 * Y; 
X2 I"" V2 * Y; 
NormalX := X1 * sigma + lml; {This gives Normal-(l1Dl,sigmaA2)} 
ead; {NormalX} 




telrpU := Rand(x); 
CauchyX := tan(pi * (tempO - 0.5)) + median I beta; 
ead; {CauchyX} 
fuDc:ticm fuzzyReal (r: REAL): REAL; {Only use this for a quick test inAWB} 
begin 
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